A free VPN extension that promises privacy can end up doing the opposite. Socket’s Threat Research Team has linked 737 Chrome Web Store extensions, published from at least 40 developer accounts, to a single operator that routes users’ whole browser sessions through its own SOCKS5 proxies.
Of those extensions, 274 impersonate 66 established VPN and privacy brands. BleepingComputer listed Proton VPN, NordVPN, Surfshark, ExpressVPN and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1 resolver among the copied names. Together the extensions racked up 75,486 installs by Chrome Web Store counts, mostly from Russian-speaking users trying to reach blocked services such as Instagram, ChatGPT and YouTube.
What the extensions actually do
Socket analyzed the code of 525 extensions. Of the 522 it pulled in bulk, 520 set Chrome’s proxy to a fixed SOCKS5 server on port 1082 and exempted only loopback addresses, so everything else went through the operator. “With all browser traffic forced through it, the threat actor’s server is positioned to read every destination, every TLS SNI value, the victim’s source IP, and any request body sent over plain HTTP,” Socket explained, as quoted by BleepingComputer.
The researchers were careful about the limits of what they could see. They observed only the client side and made no claim about what the proxy servers keep. Still, they documented several signs of deliberate deception:
– Hidden lookups: 104 extensions resolve their proxy hostnames through Cloudflare or Google DNS-over-HTTPS and hand Chrome a raw IP address, so the victim’s machine never sends a plaintext DNS query for the operator’s domains. – Fake premium servers: A paid tier advertised servers in Japan, Singapore, Canada, Australia and Turkey. None of the 200 hostnames resolved. – Store deception: Socket cited false statements submitted to Chrome Web Store reviewers and code swapped in after approval.
The operator appears to run a subscription VPN business in Russia, with the extensions working as its customer-acquisition funnel, Socket said.
What to do
Google had removed more than 200 of the extensions, but over 500 were still available when the research came out. Socket has published the IDs of all of them. Users and IT teams should check browsers against that list, remove any matches and confirm that Chrome’s proxy settings are back to normal. For managed fleets, an allowlist for browser extensions closes off the problem.


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